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1. Introduction 
 
An important tendency, emerged in the last decade with the diffusion of the “new 
economy” (i.e. the adoption of Information and Communication Technologies), is the 
introduction in many firms of new organizational schemes (involving job rotation, work 
teams, quality norms), characterized by multi-tasking. The studies undertaken in order to 
assess the effects of these new practices on firms performance and on working conditions 
show, on the one hand, a positive impact on productivity and, on the other hand, an 
ambiguous effect on workers well-being (with new organizational schemes reducing 
failures and making work more interesting but also increasing pressure on workers and 
raising injuries and mental strain). Since this is a crucial aspect that must be taken into 
account to evaluate the long-run sustainability of the “new economy paradigm”, it is 
important to investigate, also from a theoretical point of view, the consequences of the 
adoption of the new organizational schemes. 
  
This paper (that extends and generalizes a previous contribution, see Boucekkine, Crifo 
and Mattalia, 2004) considers a model that studies the effects of multi-tasking in an 
economy in which individuals devote time both to production and to human capital 
accumulation (in order to acquire the knowledge necessary to use the new technologies) 
and in which they perform different tasks. In particular, this model assumes that multi-
tasking not only increases output but it also increases costs for the firms (due to interactions 
among tasks) and induces disutility for the individuals (due to an increase in work rhythms 
when an individual is faced with many tasks to be performed). Different specifications of 
the cost function linked to the presence of multi-tasking are considered (so that these costs 
can be interpreted both as “coordination costs” or as “polyvalence costs”) and the 
decentralized solution (where households and firms solve separately their optimization 
problems) and the centralized solution (where a central planner solves the optimization 
problem) are compared for this economy. The main result is that the social optimum is 
characterized by a number of tasks per worker lower than the number obtained in the 
decentralized economy. Also consumption and production are lower in correspondence of 
the social optimum than in the decentralized solution, that is therefore sub-optimal 
(confirming the empirical findings according to which an extensive use of multi-tasking can 
have negative effects). 
 
Some policy measures are then considered, in order to correct such sub-optimality; in 
particular, the effects of a tax applied on the consumer side, of a tax applied on the firm 
side and of a form of labour regulation are studied. The conclusion that emerges is that the 
first two measures have no long-run effects on the number of tasks performed by each 
worker (that should be reduced), and only the third one can be successfully used to 
eliminate the sub-optimality that arises in the decentralized economy.    
 
2. The model, the decentralized economy and the social optimum 
 
The model (see also Boucekkine, Crifo and Mattalia, 2004 for a more detailed 
description and derivation) considers an economy in discrete time, with a productive side 
characterized by a representative firm that produces according to the technology: 
 
( ) ( )αα tttttt nLThAy ⋅⋅⋅⋅= −1  
 
where 10 << α , tA  is a productivity parameter, tL  is the number of workers with 
human capital th , tT  is worker’s productive time and tn  is the number of tasks performed 
per worker. 
The profits (assuming the price of output equal to 1) are then given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ttttttttttt LThwfnLThA ⋅⋅⋅−−⋅⋅⋅= − ααπ 1   
 
where tw  is the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor and tf  is a function that represents 
the costs linked to the presence of multi-tasking. Different specifications can be adopted for 
this function, for instance ( )θ1/ −⋅= tttt nndf  (so that these costs depend on the rate of 
change in the number of tasks performed per worker), ( ) )/(/ 1 tttttt Thnndf θ−⋅=  (so 
that they depend inversely also on the level of human capital and on productive time),  
θ
ttt ndf ⋅=  (so that they depend on the absolute number of tasks performed per worker), 
with 0>td  and  0>θ . In this way, the different formulations allow to interpret these 
costs both as “coordination costs” and as “polyvalence costs” linked to the presence of 
multi-tasking (the idea is that increasing the number of tasks per worker raises costs 
because of interactions among tasks, see Becker and Murphy, 1992). The consequence is 
that, on the one hand, multi-tasking increases output but, on the other hand, it also induces 
costs which reduce profits.  
The consumption side is then characterized by a representative household that has a utility 
function given by: 
 
σγ +⋅−= 1)(ln),( tttt ncncu  
 
where tc  is consumption and 
σγ +⋅− 1)( tn  represents the disutility for the individuals 
deriving from multi-tasking, with 0>γ  and 0≥σ  (the idea is that increasing the 
number of tasks per worker increases work rhythms, and work intensification induces 
disutility, see Askenazy, 2001). 
The household then holds assets ta  and is endowed with one unit of time each period, that 
is spent on working (the fraction tT ) or on human capital accumulation (the fraction 
tT−1 ), and the accumulation of human capital is described by the equation: 
 
( ) δδ −+ −⋅⋅= 11 1 tttt ThEh  
 
where 0>δ  and tE  is an efficiency parameter. 
Given this structure of the model, the decentralized economy is characterized by the 
fact that household and firm solve separately their optimization programs. The household’s 
intertemporal optimization problem is: 
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where β  is the discount factor (with 10 << β ) and tr  is the interest rate, while the 
firm’s intertemporal optimization problem is: 
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The centralized economy, on the contrary, is characterized by the presence of a central 
planner that solves the following intertemporal optimization problem: 
 
{ }
( )[ ]∑∞
=
+
−
∞
=+ 0
1
,,,
lnmax
01 t
tt
t
hnTc
nc
ttttt
σγβ  
s.t. ( ) ( ) ttttttt fnLThAc −= − αα1  
( ) δδ −+ −= 11 1 tttt ThEh  
 
Solving these problems, writing the equations that characterize the steady-state and 
finding the corresponding values of the different variables, the main result is that, at the 
steady-state, the centralized economy is characterized by a number of tasks per worker, a 
level of production and a level of consumption lower than the corresponding values in the 
decentralized economy. This is due to the fact that in a centralized economy the central 
planner takes into account the disutility on individuals caused by an excessive number of 
tasks per worker, while in a decentralized economy this aspect is neglected by the firms that 
choose the number of tasks performed.  
The decentralized solution is therefore sub-optimal (confirming the empirical findings 
according to which an extensive use of multi-tasking can have negative effects), and at this 
point some policy measures can be considered, in order to correct such sub-optimality. 
 
3. Policy measures and conclusions 
 
A first policy measure is represented by a tax applied on the consumer side, more 
precisely a tax applied on the labour income of the consumers, so that the wage earned per 
unit of labour becomes ( )htw τ−1  where hτ  is the tax rate applied to the households.  
A second policy measure is represented by a tax applied on the firm side, more 
precisely a tax applied on the labour cost of the firm, so that the amount paid by the firm 
per unit of labour becomes ( )ftw τ+1  where fτ  is the tax rate applied to the firm. 
Nevertheless, solving the optimization problem of the decentralized economy in these two 
cases it turns out that the steady-state values of the different variables (in particular of the 
number of tasks performed per worker) are not affected by the tax rates, and therefore these 
kinds of policies cannot be used to correct the sub-optimality of the economy.  
A third policy measure that can be applied is represented by a form of labour 
regulation, according to which the government increases the number of hours worked. In 
this case it is possible to show that the effect is a decrease in the number of tasks performed 
per worker, and this effect lasts also in the long-run.  
The conclusion of the analysis is therefore that the first two policies have no long-run 
effects on the relevant variables, and only the third type of policy measure can be 
successfully used in order  to correct the sub-optimality that arises in the decentralized 
economy.    
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